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In this work, we explore the analogy between entanglement and secret classical correlations in
the context of large networks, more precisely the question of percolation of secret correlations in
a network. It is known that entanglement percolation in quantum networks can display a highly
nontrivial behavior depending on the topology of the network and on the presence of entanglement
between the nodes. Here we show that this behavior, thought to be of a genuine quantum nature,
also occurs in a classical context.
In 1993, Maurer introduced an information-
theoretically secure secret-key agreement scenario
where two honest parties, Alice and Bob, have access
to many independent outcomes of random variables
A,B correlated with the eavesdropper’s (Eve) variable
E through the probability distribution PA,B,E(a, b, e).
Their goal is to extract a secret key from their data with
the help of; (i) local manipulations of their respective
variables, using protocols such as error correction codes
and privacy amplification; (ii) communicating over a
public channel, i.e., using local operations and public
communication [1].
It was later observed in [2, 3] that Maurer’s scenario
shares a lot of similitudes with the quantum scenario
where Alice, Bob and Eve share an initial quantum state
ρABE and Alice and Bob’s task is to distill a maximum
amount of entanglement qubits (ebits), i.e.,
|ψ〉AB = 1√
2
[|00〉+ |11〉], (1)
using local operations and classical communication. In
the same way as entanglement can be seen as a resource
that cannot increase under local operations and classical
communication, secret classical correlations are measured
in secret bits (sbits), i.e.,
PA,B,E(a, b, e) =
1
2
δa,bPE(e), (2)
a universal resource that cannot increase under local op-
erations and public communication. In this expression,
δa,b = 1 if a = b and δa,b = 0 otherwise and PE(e)
refers to any possible distribution of Eve’s random vari-
able e, which is therefore completely uncorrelated with
Alice and Bob’s variables. In [2], it was shown that many
quantum information processing protocols have an equiv-
alent protocol in Maurer’s secure secret-key scenario. For
example, the analog of quantum teleportation is simply
one-time pad, see Figure 1 (b). Similarly, entanglement
distillation, entanglement dilution, (probabilistic) single-
copy conversion were also shown to have secure secret-
key analogous protocols. It is not surprising then that
entanglement measures, such as the entanglement distil-
lation and entanglement of formation, have their corre-
sponding secure secret-key measure [1, 4, 5]. The con-
nection between entanglement and secure secret-key has
benefited the research in both fields. On the first hand,
Gisin and Wolf asked whether a classical secrecy analog
of bound entanglement [4] existed. This question was
positively answered in [6], where a tripartite (plus Eve)
distribution PABCE(a, b, c, e) was shown to need previ-
ously established secrecy between the honest parties to
be generated, but from which no secret key could be dis-
tilled. Despite further results [7, 8], it still an open ques-
tion whether there exists bipartite bound-secrecy while
bipartite bound-entanglement is known to exist. On the
other hand, the secrecy measure intrinsic information,
introduced in [9] and shown to be a lower-bound of the
secret distillation and an upper-bound of the secret of
formation in [5], was generalized to the quantum sce-
nario in [10]. There, the authors introduced the squashed
entanglement measure which has recently received a lot
of attention [11, 12].
In this paper, we want to explore the analogy between
entanglement and secret classical correlations in the con-
text of large networks. More precisely, we study the per-
colation of secret correlations in lattices. In the quantum
case, when the goal is to establish ebits between two ar-
bitrary nodes of a quantum lattice, there exists a phase
transition for entanglement percolation for which the suc-
cess probability does not decrease exponentially with the
distance between the two nodes [13]. More interestingly,
Ref. [13] gave the first example of a quantum protocol
that changes the topology of the network, making pos-
sible the distillation of a perfect entanglement link in
a regime where traditional percolation would fail. This
phenomenon was further studied in [14–18] and extended
to the mixed state scenario [19–21]. In the present work,
we show that the same phenomenon already happens in
the purely classical context of Maurer’s secret-key agree-
ment scenario.
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2I. SECRET-KEY NETWORKS
In this work, we study secrecy distribution in secret-
key networks, see Fig.1, (a). More precisely, we are inter-
ested in secret-key networks where each edge a¯b, between
nodes A and B, corresponds to a biased secret-key bit
PA,B,E(a, b, e) = [(1− p)δa,b,0 + pδa,b,1] ∗ PE(e) (3)
where δa,b,x := δabδax and p ≤ 1/2.
Figure 1: (Color online.) Secret-key networks: a) A general
secret-key network is composed of a set of nodes (vertices of
the graph) distributed with a given geometry, sharing secrecy
correlations when connected by a link (edges of the graph).
b) One-time Pad : In order to establish a unbiased secret bit
between, previously unconnected, nodes A and C, B and C
apply one round of one-time pad; (i) B publicly announces
the value of z = b1 ⊕ b2; (ii) C calculates c′ = c ⊕ z which
gives c′ = a.
The question we want to address is the following: given
a secret-key network and a choice of two nodes, does there
exist a strategy, based on local manipulations of the bits
and public classical communication, allowing to distill a
secret bit (sbit) between these two nodes? Let us first
start by considering some simple examples of networks
as their analysis will be useful for the rest of the paper.
A. Simple examples
A single link : The simplest network consists of two
nodes, A and B, sharing a biased secret bit following a
Bernoulli distribution of parameter p ≤ 1/2 given by Eq.
(3). The results for probabilistic conversion of [2] (see
Appendix 1) show that the probability to convert this
biased secret bit into an unbiased one is equal to 2p. A
protocol achieving this optimal value is the following. Let
a be Alice and Bob’s bit. If a = 0 (which happens with
probability 1 − p ≥ 1/2), Alice tosses a biased coin that
gives "heads" with probability (1−2p)/(1−p). If she gets
"heads", she tells Bob to abort the protocol; otherwise,
they keep a as the final sbit. It is easy to check that
conditioned on the fact that the protocol did not abort,
the value of a is unbiased.
A chain with 2 links: consider the scenario shown in
Fig. 1, (b) with three nodes where A and B share a bi-
ased secret bit (a = b1) while B and C share a second
biased secret bit b2 = c. The probability of establish-
ing a unbiased bit between nodes A and C can only be
lower or equal to the probability of conversion of a sin-
gle link. Surprisingly, there exists a strategy succeeding
with average probability 2p. This strategy uses one-time
pad, the secret-key protocol analogous to quantum tele-
portation: node B simply publicly announces the value
of b1⊕ b2. If b1⊕ b2 = 1, which happens with probability
2p(1− p), C flips his bit and obtains an unbiased secret
bit shared with A. If b1 ⊕ b2 = 0, A and C secret-key
(unnormalized) distribution becomes
PA,C,E(a, c, e) ∝ [(1− p)2δa,c,0 + p2δa,c,1] ∗ PE(e), (4)
which has a conversion probability Pc = 2 p
2
p2+(1−p)2 .
Putting everything together gives an average probabil-
ity of success of
Psucc = P (b1 ⊕ b2 = 1) ∗ 1 + P (b1 ⊕ b2 = 0) ∗ Pc
= 2p(1− p) + 2p2 = 2p. (5)
Two parallel links: if the nodes A and B share two
biased secret bits a1 and a2 (with p ≤ 1 − 1/
√
2), the
optimal probabilistic conversion strategy (see Theorem 2
of Appendix 1) consists for nodes A and B in mapping
their two bits into a new bit af such that af = 0 if
a1 = a2 = 0 and af = 1 otherwise. The bit af then
follows a Bernoulli distribution with parameter (1 − p)2
and the probability to convert it into an unbiased secret
bit is 2(1− (1− p)2) = 2p(2− p).
B. The straightforward strategy
As in the quantum scenario [13], there exists one natu-
ral strategy to distill an unbiased secret bit between two
arbitrary nodes, A and B, of a given lattice L. This pro-
tocol consists in trying to convert each biased secret bit
(corresponding to each edge of the lattice) into an un-
biased secret bit, each conversion succeeding with some
probability psucc. If there exists a path among the edges
of the unbiased secret bit graph connecting nodes A and
B, then, using one-time pad along this path, one can
produce a secret bit between nodes A and B. Based
on percolation theory, one can show that the probabil-
ity that two arbitrary nodes are connected by a path
does not depend on their distance in the graph if psucc is
larger than the critical percolation threshold probability
pLc of the lattice. For psucc ≤ pLc the success probabil-
ity of the overall procedure decreases exponentially with
3the distance in the lattice between the two nodes (see
Appendix 2 for details). The question that one wishes
to answer is whether or not this simple strategy is opti-
mal and whether the bound corresponding to pLc is tight.
In the case of entanglement percolation, it was shown in
[13] that the strategy described above is asymptotically
optimal in the case of one-dimensional chains but not in
general for two-dimensional lattices. In the following, we
show that these two statements also apply to the case of
secret classical correlations.
II. ONE-DIMENSIONAL CHAIN
A. Presentation of the problem
Let us consider a one-dimensional chain with n links
and n+1 nodes: A0, A1, · · · , An. Each link i corresponds
to a pair of biased perfectly correlated variables, as in
Eq.(3). Because each pair is perfectly correlated, we sim-
plify the discussion by noting ai the single bit shared by
Ai−1 and Ai, as shown in Fig. 2. In this model, the eaves-
Figure 2: (Color online.) 1D-chain (4 nodes in the figure):
The protocol giving the best probability of distilling a secret
bit between nodes A0 and An works as follows: (i) Each in-
termediate node, Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1), makes public the value
of the sum (modulo 2) of its two bits: zi = ai ⊕ ai+1; (ii)
Node An calculates privatly an⊕∑n−1i=1 zi; (iii) Nodes A0 and
An apply the optimal probabilistic conversion protocol for the
given set (z1, ..., zn−1).
dropper has no prior information on the bits ai (except
for the value of p), meaning that her initial probability
distribution is uncorrelated with (a1, · · · , an). We will
now show that the probability of establishing a perfect
secret bit between the extremities of a chain, (between
A0 and An) decreases exponentially fast with n, except
if the chain is initially composed of perfect secret bits,
i.e., if p = 1/2. Hence, with that respect, distribution
of secrecy and distribution of entanglement display the
same behavior in the case of one-dimensional chains.
B. Description of the optimal protocol
Let us first start with the smallest, but non-trivial,
case of 2 links. The general proof will then follow by
induction. As shown on Fig. 2, nodes A0 and A1 share
the biased secret bit a1 and nodes A1 and A2 share a2.
Both bits, a1 and a2, are biased and have value 0 with
probability 1−p. The goal is for A0 and A2 is to distill a
secret bit unknown to Eve, who had no prior information
on a1 and a2.
In order to succeed, node A1 has to publicly announce
some information, z1, depending on his own bits a1 and
a2 and possibly on some random ancillary bits. This
public information should allow nodes A0 and A2 to
distill a secret bit, without giving any information to
Eve. In full generality, node A1 may use a probabilistic
strategy to generate z1. However, because every proba-
bilistic strategy is a convex combination of deterministic
ones, a probabilistic strategy cannot be better than the
best deterministic one. Therefore, it is sufficient to con-
sider the set of deterministic functions z1 = f(a1, a2).
Since A1 simply needs to tell node A2 whether it should
keep its bit a2 or flip it in order to match the secret
bit a1, z1 only needs to take 2 possible values, 0 or
1. As a consequence, we only need to analyse 16 pos-
sible functions f of a1 and a2. The constraints of the
problem help us find the only possibility for f . First,
node A2 should be able to recover a1 from the knowl-
edge of a2 and z1, imposing f(0, a2) 6= f(1, a2). Second,
Eve should not learn any information about a1, impos-
ing
∑
a2
f(0, a2) =
∑
a2
f(1, a2). Up to a relabeling, the
only function that satisfies these constraints is the exclu-
sive or (XOR): f(a1, a2) = a1 ⊕ a2. It is not surprising
that we obtain exactly the one-time pad protocol, which
achieves a success probability of 2p for a three node chain,
as shown before.
Generalization to n links: In a scenario with more
links, it is easy to see that the same reasoning ap-
plies. In particular, all the intermediate nodes should
announce the XOR of their two bits, up to some relabel-
ing. The protocol is therefore the following. Each inter-
mediate node Ai (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1) publicly announces
zi = ai ⊕ ai+1. The final node can then compute the
value of a1 since a1 = an ⊕ zn−1 ⊕ zn−2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ z1. Once
nodes A0 and An share this (biased) secret bit, they can
proceed with the optimal probabilistic conversion proto-
col of Theorem 2 and end up with a unbiased secret bit.
The average success probability reads
pn =
∑
z1,··· ,zn−1
p(z1, · · · , zn−1)p(success|z1, · · · , zn−1)
(6)
where p(success|z1, · · · , zn−1) corresponds to the success
probability of conversion of the bit given that the vector
4announced by the intermediate nodes is (z1, · · · , zn−1).
The success probability is equal to (twice) the first half
of the binomial expansion (see Appendix 3):
pn = 2
∑
first half
(
n
k
)
pn−k(1− p)k (7)
which can be lower bounded, as shown in the Appendix
3, by
pn ≤ (2
√
p(1− p))n. (8)
Despite doing better than the straighforward strategy,
which gives a success probability of (2p)n, it still de-
creases exponentially fast with n for initial unbiased se-
cret bit (p 6= 1/2), similarly as in the quantum scenario
[13]. This result is not surprising as for percolation to
occur, it is crucial that the topology of the network al-
lows for many different paths between two given nodes to
exist, which is not possible in a one-dimensional chain.
III. TWO-DIMENSIONAL CASE
A possible strategy to distill a secret-key between ar-
bitrary nodes of a lattice consists in using the straight-
forward strategy presented in Section IB. First, one tries
to distill a secret bit over each link in the lattice. If the
probability of success is above the percolation threshold
of the lattice, then with a positive probability, this pro-
cedure created a path consisting of secret bits between
the two arbitrary nodes. This path can then be used to
establish a secret bit between these two nodes thanks to
one-time pad.
Following Ref.[13], we now give an explicit example
of a 2-dimensional lattice where local preprocessing and
public communication allows one to change the topology
of the initial lattice into another one with a lower perco-
lation threshold. This shows that there exist non-trivial
strategies that succeed to establish a secret bit between
two nodes when the naive strategy would fail. The pro-
tocol involves three basic operations that were described
in Section I: (i) the conversion of a single link into an
sbit with success probability p1 = 2p; (ii) the conversion
of two consecutive links into an sbit, also with success
probability p2 = 2p; (iii) the conversion of two parallel
links, with success probability p// = 2p(2− p).
Let us consider an initial honeycomb (hexagonal) lat-
tice, as shown in Figure 3, where each link of the lattice
consists of 2 biased secret-key bits with parameter p. For
this lattice, the naive strategy of Section IB succeeds
with constant probability as soon as p// ≥ phexc , where
the percolation threshold probability for the honeycomb
lattice is given by
phexc = 1− sin(2pi/18) ≈ 0.6527. (9)
Therefore, the straightforward percolation strategy suc-
ceeds only for p ≥ 0.1792.
Figure 3: (Color online.) The initial configuration is a hon-
eycomb (hexagonal) lattice, each node being represented by
a circle. Each two adjaccent nodes are connected by two
links, each one representing a biased secret-key bit. Using
local operations and public communication, we can tranform
the topology to a triangular lattice improving the percolation
threshold. To do so, every yellow node performs three parallel
one-time pad operations, one for each pair of connected links
(labeled by a star in the interior of the brown node). This
tranforms every pair of connected links into a link of the new
triangular lattice (see black stars for those corresponding to
the brown node).
As illustrated in Ref. [13], one might consider a more
elaborate strategy, namely, one can try to change the
topology of the lattice in order to facilitate percolation.
As shown in Figure 3, the idea is that half the nodes from
the original lattice should work together in order to create
a triangular lattice. To do that, these nodes perform one-
time pad over each pair of connected biased secret-key
bits. It is easy to see that each link of the triangular
lattice will be distilled into an sbit with probability p2 =
2p. Percolation can then occur as soon as p2 exceeds the
threshold percolation probability of the triangular lattice,
ptriangc = sin(2pi/18) ≈ 0.3473. (10)
This "topology conversion" strategy is therefore compati-
ble with percolation of sbits for p ≥ 0.1736. We conclude
that in the regime where p ∈ [0.1736, 0.1792], percola-
tion can occur if the nodes use the non-trivial percola-
tion strategy consisting in changing the topology of the
lattice from honeycomb to triangular, while the straight-
forward strategy fails. Other quantum percolation exam-
ples [14, 15] can also been easily adapted to the secet-key
percolation scenario, using the tools presented here.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, using known analogies between entangle-
ment and classical secret-key correlations, we have stud-
ied secrecy percolation in networks. More precisely, we
have shown that local operations and public communi-
cation can be used to change the topology of a secrecy
network and to establish a secret key between nodes, in a
5regime where the initial lattice configuration is not com-
patible with percolation of secrecy. This effect was al-
ready known to exist in quantum entanglement networks.
Our work shows that this phenomenon thought to be of a
genuine quantum nature, already appears in the context
of classical secret correlations.
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Appendix
1. Pure State Conversions
In Ref. [2], the authors characterized the set of trans-
formations which are allowed among probability distribu-
tions. Their characterization is reminiscent of the quan-
tum case [22] and uses the same notion of majorization.
Theorem 1 (Deterministic conversion [2]). If Alice and
Bob begin with an arbitrary classical bipartite pure state,
PABE(i, j, k) = δi,jpiPE(k), then they can produce a new
state P ′ABE(i, j, k) = δi,jqiPE(k) if and only if ~q ma-
jorizes ~p.
Recall that the vector ~q = {qi} is said to majorize the
vector ~p = {pi} (with p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · and q1 ≥ q2 ≥ · · · )
if
k∑
i=1
qi ≥
k∑
i=1
pi ∀k. (11)
Whereas Theorem 1 is only concerned with conversion
strategies which work with probability 1, the following
result deals with strategies which work with a finite prob-
ability. Note that again, one recovers the same result as
in the quantum case [23].
Theorem 2 (Probabilistic conversion [2]). If Alice and
Bob begin with an arbitrary classical bipartite pure state,
PABE(i, j, k) = δi,jpiPE(k), then the maximal probability
with which they can produce a new state P ′ABE(i, j, k) =
δi,jqiPE(k) is given by
min
k
1−∑ki=1 pi
1−∑ki=1 qi . (12)
2. Bond-percolation in Lattices
The percolation behaviors that appear in the context
of quantum networks or secrecy networks are closely re-
lated to the concept of bond-percolation. The scenario
of bond-percolation is the following. Consider a lattice L
such that for each edge of L, the bond is open (or equiv-
alently, the edge is present) with probability p. Taking
the limit where the size of L is infinite, one can define the
probability θ(p) that a randomly chosen node belongs to
a cluster of infinite size. Then, there exists a critical
percolation probability pLc such that:
• θ(p) > 0 if p > pLc ,
• θ(p) = 0 if p < pLc .
The link to our problem is immediate. Given two arbi-
trary nodes of the lattice, one is interested in whether an
unbiased secret bit can be established between them. In
the case where there exists an infinite size component,
then both nodes belong to this cluster with probability
θ2(p) and an unbiased secret bit can be established be-
tween them. Otherwise, if there is no cluster of infinite
size, the probability of establishing an unbiased secret
bit decreases exponentially with the distance between the
nodes in the lattice L.
3. Analysis of the protocol of Section IIB
Let us consider the same scenario of a chain of n links
where each link is a biased secret bit that takes value 1
with probability p ≤ 1/2, and bound the probability of
creating a secret bit between the extremities.
As we saw in Section II B, the protocol consists first in
publicly announcing the vector z = (z1, · · · , zn−1), and
then conditionally on the value of z, try to convert the
bit shared by A0 and An into an sbit. The probability of
success pn of this procedure is therefore given by:
pn =
∑
z1,··· ,zn−1
p(z1, · · · , zn−1)p(success|z1, · · · , zn−1)
(13)
where p(success|z1, · · · , zn−1) corresponds to the success
probability of conversion of the bit given that the vector
announced by the intermediate nodes is (z1, · · · , zn−1).
The probability that the public communication is de-
scribed by z = (z1, · · · , zn−1) is
p(z) = p(a1 = 0, a2 = z1, · · · , an =
⊕
k
zk) +
p(a1 = 1, a2 = 1⊕ z1, · · · , an = 1
⊕
k
zk)
Given a particular value of z, the success probability
6for the probabilistic conversion of Theorem 2 reads:
p(success|z) =
min(p(a1 = 0, · · · , an =
⊕
zk), p(a1 = 1, · · · , an = 1
⊕
zk))
p(a1 = 0, · · · , an =
⊕
k zk) + p(a1 = 1, · · · , an = 1
⊕
zk)
.
Putting everything together, one has
pn = 2
∑
a
min(p(a1, · · · , an), p(a1, · · · , an))
= 2
∑
a
min(pw(a)(1− p)n−w(a), pn−w(a)(1− p)w(a))
= 2
∑
a
pn−w(a)(1− p)w(a)
= 2
∑
first half
(
n
k
)
pn−k(1− p)k
where a = (a1, · · · , an), ak := 1 ⊕ ak, w(a) denotes the
Hamming weight of the vector a and "first half" means
that the sum contains exactly the first half of the bi-
nomial expansion, that is, the 2n−1 first terms of this
expansion.
This probability is achieved if all the intermediate
nodes (n− 1 such nodes) reveal the value of the XOR of
their two bits.
This success probability is equal to (twice) the first half
of the binomial expansion. Let us bound this quantity:
pn = 2
∑
first half
(
n
k
)
pn−k(1− p)k (14)
≤ 2pbn/2c(1− p)dn/2e
∑
first half
(
n
k
)
(15)
≤ pbn/2c(1− p)dn/2e
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
(16)
≤ 2npbn/2c(1− p)dn/2e (17)
≤ (2
√
p(1− p))n, (18)
which goes down to 0 exponentially fast with n for p 6=
1/2.
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